Tactical Analysis: Roma vs Lazio

The Rome derby, also known as the Derby della Capitale, is arguably the most politically charged rivalry in Italian football. This fierce contest traces its roots back to the era of Benito Mussolini. Historically, Roma stood as a symbol of resistance against Mussolini’s regime, while Lazio was often regarded as his favorite club. This derby has come to embody the clash between left- and right-wing political ideologies over the years, adding layers of intensity to the encounters.

The rivalry extends beyond the pitch, with passionate fans showcasing their allegiance through chants, banners, and tifos at the Stadio Olimpico. While the history is fascinating, today our focus is on the tactical battle that unfolded on the field.

Roma’s Current Form and Management

Roma’s season has been tumultuous, with three managerial changes to date. They began with club legend Daniele De Rossi at the helm but have since settled on Claudio Ranieri, who previously managed the club in 2019. Under Ranieri’s guidance, Roma appears to have regained some stability. In their last four matches, they’ve been impressive, securing three wins and drawing against a formidable AC Milan side. Their structure and tactical discipline have visibly improved.

Lazio’s Season Under Marco Baroni

Lazio started the season brightly under manager Marco Baroni, showcasing an aggressive and effective style of play. However, their momentum took a significant hit after a 6-0 drubbing by Inter Milan. Since that defeat, their form has been inconsistent, raising questions about their defensive organization and ability to control games against top-tier opposition. When these two teams clash, it’s not just about football—it’s about passion, pride, and history. The energy among fans and players is palpable, making this derby a spectacle that transcends sport.

 

How to Feed Between-the-Lines Players

Roma, in possession, used a 3-2-4-1 structure but displayed some interesting rotations against Lazio’s 4-2-3-1 pressing, which at times resembled a 4-4-2. Lazio employed a zonal pressing approach that depended on the ball’s location, the positions of teammates, and the opposition. This pressing was more passive, focusing on denying Roma access through the middle. However, when Roma attempted to build up from the back or play through wide areas, Lazio shifted to a man-to-man press, effectively sandwiching the player with the ball along the line.

In modern football, the primary tactical challenge is finding players “between the lines” to break the opponent’s defensive structure. There are multiple ways to achieve this, heavily influenced by the coach’s philosophy.

Roma’s Tactical Approach

Coaches like Pep Guardiola and Roberto De Zerbi favor controlled build-up play, while managers such as José Mourinho or Claudio Ranieri often prefer a more direct approach. In the build-up phase, Roma utilized their goalkeeper or left-sided defender N’Dicka to play long balls, targeting their striker who drifted to the left side to create an overload.

Dovyak played a crucial role by using his hold-up ability to challenge Lazio’s center-back, winning aerial duels and linking up with Roma’s between-the-lines players (Dybala and Pellegrini). This tactic created space for far-side wingers like Saelemaekers, leading to a 4-vs-3 advantage for Roma. It was an effective strategy for bypassing multiple lines of Lazio’s defensive block while minimizing risk.

Low-Risk vs High-Risk Build-Up

Starting build-up play with short passes from the goalkeeper requires high levels of coordination and carries a significant risk of losing possession. Ranieri, however, opts for a low-risk approach in such situations.

Lazio’s defensive shape was often compact and oriented toward their opponent’s goal, making it difficult for their players to immediately turn 180 degrees and chase back when Roma bypassed the press with long passes. This efficient method of feeding between-the-lines players highlights Ranieri’s pragmatic tactical mindset, contrasting with the higher-risk strategies of the more possession-oriented coach.

Pivot Dropped Deep

Playing with a 4-2-3-1 merits dropping a midfielder into the back line to create a numerical advantage to progress the ball. There are two types of dropping:

1. Dropping between the central defenders.
2. Dropping beside the central backs.

Making an Overload to Progress the Ball (Pivot Dropped Deep – Lazio)

Lazio used both methods in the game. Guendouzi dropped deep and formed a back three, but why were they using this, and what was the advantage? Roma used a 5-3-2 pressing system, which was more man-intensive. Throughout the game, Roma spent the majority of the time either in a mid-block or a low-block.

To overcome the first line with a numerical advantage, Lazio employed what is known as 3-vs-2 or ‘La Salida Lavolpiana.’ The center-backs moved wider and acted as ball carriers. The fullbacks advanced to function as wing-backs, while wide forwards Zaccagni and Isaksen shifted inside.

Now the question arises: When a center-back moves forward with the ball, who should close them down? Roma answered brilliantly, with their center-backs (Mancini and N’Dicka) aggressively closing down the wide forwards, who were now positioned between the lines.

Rovella Dropping Beside the Central Backs

The second approach Lazio used was Rovella dropping beside the central backs, primarily on the left-hand side, where Lazio focused most of their attacks against Roma. This tactic changed the verticality of their attacks and overloaded the left-hand side.

Dropping into the wide area offered distinct advantages: in central zones, the pivot behind the opponent’s strikers has much less time and space to operate. However, when the pivot drops wide, it creates confusion for the opponent’s second-line wide player—should they press or hold their position? This indecision often opens inside spaces for between-the-lines players to exploit.

Zaccagni’s Double Movements Created Problems for Mancini

When Rovella was in the wide area with the ball, Zaccagni’s double movements caused problems for Mancini. Initially, Zaccagni would move towards the ball before quickly shifting towards the opponent’s goal, creating space behind him. However, Hummels shifted toward the right to cover Zaccagni effectively, and the entire defense followed the shift in that direction. I think Lazio’s were a little bit slow in the case of ball circulation so Roma’s defense was able to shift from side to side.

Roma’s  compact defence

After the early lead, Ranieri’s defense was quite compact in the deep and had less space for vertical attack for Lazio. They were very good at covering when one player going to close down a player then another player covered the place, especially in the defence. Second half Lazio became frustrated when they found no space in the middle and tried to early cross in the middle with wingbacks. It was easy for Roma to predict those crosses. Roma tried to counter some time the place where Rovella Dropped deep and Debyla and Dovyak were the rest offence players. Debyla collected the clearance and tried to hold and attack the gap, switching the ball opposite side towards Angelino.